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THE CITIZENSHIP OF OTHERS 
Muneer I. Ahmad* 
INTRODUCTION 
The liberal notion of citizenship provides equality to all citizens, without 
regard to ascriptive or other differentiating characteristics.  In this sense, 
citizenship promises to be dispositive of the treatment of all individuals 
who enjoy it; citizenship is uniform, unalloyed, and indivisible.  These are 
the attributes of citizenship within a liberal national system, governing the 
relationships between citizens and the state, and among citizens within the 
state.  But must these characteristics extend into the international realm, or 
may states choose to look beyond the mantle of citizenship when evaluating 
the citizens of others?  And if states do choose to differentiate, and thereby 
discriminate, among the citizens of others, what obligations do those 
citizens’ states bear? 
This Article considers two instances in which the formal equality of 
citizenship is jeopardized by discrimination on the basis of national origin 
(the place of one’s birth) and ancestry (the place of one’s ancestors’ birth).  
The first concerns the recent policy of India to subject U.S. citizens of 
Pakistani descent to differential treatment when applying for visas to visit 
India.  The second concerns an ongoing political controversy in the United 
States around whether to grant Israel admission to the visa waiver 
program—which would waive the need for Israeli and U.S. citizens to apply 
for visas to the other country—while permitting Israel to continue to subject 
U.S. citizens of Palestinian or Arab descent to differential treatment.  By 
deploying national origin and ancestry as proxies for national security 
threat, both cases violate American notions of equal citizenship, thereby 
implicating questions of U.S. responsibility to ensure the equal treatment of 
its citizens by foreign governments. 
The reliance upon national origin and ancestry discrimination by India 
and Israel exposes the multiplicity of citizenship theory and practice across 
self-conceived liberal democracies, the notion that citizenship values are 
culturally bounded, and the idea that citizenship performs different forms of 
work in different societies.  This should not be surprising, as citizenship is a 
central technology of the national project, and national projects vary widely 
by virtue of history, geography, culture, and ideology.  Put another way, 
while the principle of equal citizenship remains elusive in every society, the 
 
*  Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School.  I borrow my title, loosely, from SEYLA 
BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS:  ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS (2004).  I am grateful 
to Sam Oliker-Friedland and David Kim for outstanding research assistance. 
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pattern of the deviation from that principle may vary according to national 
project.  In the United States, national origin and ancestry discrimination 
enjoy special, albeit uneven, protection, reflecting a political and social 
consensus that such discrimination is inconsistent with the civic and legal 
norms of equal treatment.  But in other countries, similar forms of 
discrimination may prove less inimical to the citizenship project.  
Conversely, certain American practices may prove deeply offensive to other 
countries’ citizenship ideals.  In the first instance, then, the Indian visa 
regime vis-à-vis Pakistani ancestry and the proposed terms of inclusion of 
Israel within the U.S. visa waiver program reveal competing theoretical 
understandings and empirical functions of citizenship. 
These multiple theories and practices of citizenship intersect in the 
seemingly mundane realm of visa policy—the regulated interchange of 
citizens.  When the screening or selection criteria of Country A offend the 
citizenship values of Country B, Country B’s duties of equal protection to 
its citizens are triggered.  Indeed, the maintenance and fortification of 
Country B’s national project demands the consistent defense of its 
citizenship values.  States will always define their own citizenship 
categories, but in a world of constant international exchange, those 
definitions also resonate internationally, creating opportunities to shape the 
citizenships of other states.  By expounding citizenship values in protection 
of one’s own citizens, a state may also exert lasting influence on the 
citizenship commitments of other nations.  This can be done in the specific 
context of national security considerations, but could be imagined in 
relation to other state concerns as well.  Moreover, as the mobility of 
persons across state borders increases, we should expect competing 
conceptions of citizenship to become mutually constitutive.  Not unlike the 
promotion of human rights, such deployment of a normative citizenship 
runs all the risks of hegemony and claimed universality, even if not framed 
in human rights terms.  Leaving aside for the moment the normative 
question of whether citizenship should be an object of statecraft, the visa 
policy questions raised by the Indian and Israeli examples demonstrate its 
availability as a tool for shaping global citizenship norms. 
This Article begins with a description of the Indian and Israeli examples, 
explaining the operation of the respective visa policies and how, in the 
name of contemporary national security considerations, the policies enact 
culturally specific, normative conceptions of citizenship embedded in the 
deep structure of each country’s national project.  The Article then 
considers how the seemingly mundane universe of visa policy operates as a 
site of conflict among competing normative visions of citizenship, and in 
particular, the ways in which the Indian and Israeli policies threaten a 
strong, albeit imperfect, American commitment to equal citizenship.  The 
Article concludes by arguing that an understanding of the particularities of 
citizenship is necessary in order for countries such as the United States to 
propagate norms of equal citizenship and its promise of universality. 
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I.  NATIONAL ORIGIN AND ANCESTRY DISCRIMINATION IN VISA POLICY:  
TWO EXAMPLES 
The liberal conception of citizenship promises equal treatment of all 
citizens, without regard to other characteristics, including national origin or 
ancestry.  In U.S. law, protections against national origin and ancestry 
discrimination are especially robust, extending formally to citizens and 
noncitizens alike.  But citizenship in its conventional form operates 
nationally, and the rights of citizens of one country—whether rights to 
protection against state intrusion1 or to healthcare or other forms of social 
welfare—do not extend extraterritorially.  The same is true with respect to 
national notions of antidiscrimination, which, according to the liberal 
model, should converge with citizenship itself.2  Thus, a citizen’s right of 
freedom from state discrimination applies to her state alone. 
In the realm of visa policy, states historically have enjoyed unfettered 
authority, as questions of admission have been understood as integral to 
sovereignty.3  While recent developments in international human rights law, 
such as the principle of nonrefoulement,4 may begin to apply pressure on 
these classical understandings, as an empirical matter, discrimination in the 
issuance of visas remains a state’s prerogative.  Countries, including the 
United States, frequently discriminate on the basis of nationality, age, 
ideology, and marital status.5  In the American context, such decisions are 
 
 1. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 259 (1990) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents “of 
property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country”). 
 2. See ANUPAMA ROY, MAPPING CITIZENSHIP IN INDIA 8 (2010) (‘“Citizenship is a 
status bestowed on those who are full members of the community.  All who possess the 
status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.  There 
is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be but societies in 
which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against 
which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed.’” 
(quoting T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 29 (1950))). 
 3. See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1158–59 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“In 
prescribing the conditions for allowing aliens to enter the country, Congress [has] acted in 
accordance with the ancient principle of international law that a nation state has the inherent 
right to exclude or admit foreigners and to prescribe applicable terms and conditions.  This 
firmly-established principle, dating from Roman times, received recognition during the 
Constitutional Convention and has continued to be an important postulate in the foreign 
relations of this country and other members of the international community.  For more than a 
century, the Supreme Court has thus recognized the power to exclude aliens as ‘inherent in 
sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the 
country against foreign encroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised exclusively by 
the political branches of government’ and not ‘granted away or restrained on behalf of 
anyone.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972); 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 4. See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) (“No Contracting 
State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”). 
 5. The case of Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss academic whose visa was revoked by the U.S. 
government in 2004, and whose reapplication was denied in 2006, provides a recent and 
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immune from judicial review under the doctrine of consular 
nonreviewability.6 
The two examples discussed here do not involve discrimination on the 
basis of citizenship, but differential treatment of U.S. citizens on the basis 
of national origin and ancestry, which entails the violation of American 
norms of equal citizenship. 
A.  India’s Treatment of U.S. Citizens of Pakistani Descent 
To apply for a visa to India, U.S. citizens must fill out an application, 
submit payment, and await processing, first by a private company 
contracted by the Indian government, and then by the local Indian 
consulate.  For most U.S. citizens, the process typically takes three to five 
business days, if not fewer, and the consulate routinely grants multiple-
entry visas good for a period of years.  However, a separate process governs 
U.S. citizens of Pakistani descent:  for these individuals, including both 
naturalized U.S. citizens and citizens by birth, their applications require 
approval from the Ministry of Home Affairs in New Delhi.7  The Indian 
consulates state that this process requires a minimum of six weeks, though 
in practice it often takes significantly longer; three to six months is not 
uncommon.  If such applications are approved, they typically permit only a 
single entry, with a short expiry, and are stamped “US-PAK.”  In force 
since 2009, these special visa rules are well known among the Pakistani-
American community, and likely operate to restrict the number of visas 
granted to Americans of Pakistani descent.  Similar restrictions apply to 
British, Canadian, and Australian citizens of Pakistani descent. 
India’s visa application inquires explicitly about place of birth and 
ancestry, and Pakistani descent may be ascribed as far back as three 
 
germane example. See Benjamin Weiser, Court Reverses Ruling Dealing with Visa of 
Muslim Scholar, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A14 (describing the original allegations 
against Ramadan and describing a decision by the Second Circuit that the government was 
required to “confront Ramadan with the allegation against him and afford him the 
subsequent opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not 
know, and reasonably should not have known, that the recipient of his contributions was a 
terrorist organization”). 
 6. See Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1159–60 (“In view of the political nature of visa 
determinations and of the lack of any statute expressly authorizing judicial review of 
consular officers’ actions, courts have applied what has become known as the doctrine of 
consular nonreviewability.  The doctrine holds that a consular official’s decision to issue or 
withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.  For 
the greater part of this century, our court has therefore refused to review visa decisions of 
consular officials.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).  Courts have recognized limited 
exceptions to this rule. See generally James Lockhart, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability, 42 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2009). 
 7. See Processing Time, INDIA VISA CENTER, https://indiavisa.travisaoutsourcing.com/
processing-times (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); see also Visa Services, PASSPORT SEVA:  
CONSULAR, PASSPORT & VISA DIVISION, MINISTRY EXTERNAL AFF., GOV’T INDIA, 
http://passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/online/visaServices (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) 
(noting a separate visa process for “Pakistani Nationals and Foreigners of Pak Origin” in 
which a “Visa is granted to Pakistani nationals and foreigners of Pak origin only after 
clearance by concerned authorities”). 
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generations; the application requires applicants to disclose not only their 
own place of birth, but also that of their parents and grandparents.8  
Although Pakistan and India only became independent countries in 1947, 
the logic of the visa application dictates that some applicants whose parents 
or grandparents were born in British India—that is, before 1947—may 
nonetheless be deemed of Pakistani descent.  Thus, Pakistani identity 
precedes Pakistan itself.  Territory, distinct from and antecedent to, the 
nation-state, becomes an object of suspicion. 
The inquiry into national origin is not the only peculiarity of the Indian 
visa application.  Since 2010, the application also asks the applicant’s 
religion, providing choices of:  “Bahai, Buddhism, Christian, Hindu, Islam, 
Others, Parsi, Sikh, Zoroastrian.”9  The religion question, like the questions 
regarding national origin and ancestry, are required fields on the form.10 
India and Pakistan have long restricted visas to one another’s citizens,11 
and the loosening or tightening of visa availability is a familiar indicator of 
bilateral relations between the two antagonists.  Against this backdrop, it is 
tempting to read these special visa rules as merely another political 
instrument in the management of Indo-Pak relations.  But the focus on 
national origin and ancestry, rather than nationality, troubles this account.  
Moreover, as I discuss below, the historical origins of the special visa rules 
make clear that they are designed to address real or perceived national 
security concerns about Americans and other westerners of Pakistani 
descent. 
The special visa rules were introduced in December 2009, in direct 
response to the involvement of an American citizen, David Coleman 
Headley, in the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008.12  Born Daood 
 
 8. The visa application requires disclosure of the applicant’s country of birth, current 
nationality, any previously held nationality or dual citizenship, and the place of birth, current 
nationality, and any previously held nationality of the applicant’s parents. See Visa 
Application Form, BLS INT’L, http://www.visa.blsindia-usa.com/images/visasamp.gif (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2014); see also Indian Visa Online, GOV’T INDIA, http://indianvisaonline.
gov.in/visa (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 9. See Visa Application Form, supra note 8. 
 10. Id. 
 11. In September 2012, India and Pakistan concluded an agreement to ease reciprocal 
visa restrictions.  This marked the first high-level diplomatic negotiations since the Mumbai 
attacks in 2008.  The agreement included steps such as multiple-entry visas for business 
travelers and visas for children and adults over sixty-five upon arrival.  Travel restrictions, 
however, remain strict; business travelers, for example, must still apply for visas on a city-
by-city basis. See, e.g., Salman Masood, India and Pakistan Sign Visa Agreement, Easing 
Travel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2012, at A12; Haris Anwar and Augustine Anthony, India, 
Pakistan Relax Visa Requirements As Part of Peace Process, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 9, 
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-09/india-pakistan-relax-visa-requirements-
as-part-of-peace-process.html; see also Anita Joshua, India, Pakistan Ink Visa Agreement, 
HINDU (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-pakistan-ink-visa-
agreement/article3874388.ece (deeming the new agreement “the first major overhaul since 
1974”). 
 12. See Kavitha Rao, India Tightens Visa Rules, N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 5, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
http://intransit.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/india-tightens-tourist-visa-rules/?_php=true&_
type=blogs&_r=0 (providing a description of the initial rules); see also Vibhuti Agarwal, 
India Eases Tourist Visa Rules, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2012, 4:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
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Gilani in Washington, D.C., to a Pakistani father and a white American 
mother, David Headley admitted his central role in the planning of the 2008 
Mumbai terrorist attacks.13  Previously a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 
informant, Gilani also testified that he worked as an operative both for a 
Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-i-Taiba, and for the Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).14  In 2005, Gilani changed his first 
name, adopted his mother’s surname, Headley, and subsequently made 
numerous trips to India on a multiple-entry visa in order to scout targets for 
the attacks.15  Headley has since acknowledged that he changed his name in 
order to deflect suspicion among Indian authorities, because, along with his 
physical appearance and American-accented English, it would allow him to 
pass as a white American rather than as Pakistani.16 
In response to the attacks, the Indian government announced its new visa 
policies.  The policies included a mandatory sixty-day gap between entries 
on a tourist visa, in-country registration requirements if the sixty-day gap 
requirement is waived, and Home Ministry review prior to consular 
approval for frequent tourist visa applicants.17  In addition, the new policies 
provided for Home Ministry review and attendant delays of visa 
applications for individuals of Pakistani ancestry, including U.S., Canadian, 
British, and Australian citizens.  The website of the High Commission of 
India in Ottawa states the policies plainly, on a page titled “Visas to Persons 
of Pakistani Origin”: 
If you, or your parents or grandparents have/had Pak citizenship, a 
different procedure will be applicable as mentioned below. Applicants 
falling in this category may please note that visa granted to them shall be 
for a short term, usually for a period of 3 months.  It will be based on the 
specific purpose of the visit and may be further restricted regarding the 
duration and the places that can be visited in India.18 
The policy also included greater restrictions for those currently holding 
Pakistani nationality, including longer processing times, in-country 
registration requirements, and restrictions on movement within India.19  
 
indiarealtime/2012/12/04/india-eases-tourist-visa-rules/ (noting the relaxation of the initial 
sixty-day gap requirement). 
 13. See A Guilty Plea to 2 Terrorism Charges, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at A12; see 
also Ginger Thompson, Mumbai Plotter Says Work for U.S. Drug Agency Provided Cover, 
N.Y.TIMES, May 26, 2011, at A13. 
 14. See Thompson, supra note 13. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Mumbai-Attack Plotter Sentenced to 35 Years, AL JAZEERA, (Jan. 25, 2013, 
10:13 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/01/20131258846436127.html 
(“Headley changed his birth name from Daood Gilani in 2006 so he could travel to, and 
from, India more easily to do reconnaissance without raising suspicions, videotaping and 
mapping targets for the gunmen.”); see also Jane Perlez, American Terror Suspect Traveled 
Unimpeded, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A1 (“Mr. Roty was able to use his Pakistani and 
American heritage to great advantage, playing up his American descent on his mother’s side 
in India, and then behaving as a Pakistani in Pakistan, where his father was born.”). 
 17. See Agarwal, supra note 12. 
 18. Visa to Persons of Pakistani Origin, HIGH COMMISSION INDIA OTTAWA, CAN., 
http://www.hciottawa.ca/pages.php?id=132 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 19. Id. 
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Dual citizens of Pakistan and another country were deemed Pakistani 
nationals for the purposes of the visa policy.20 
Although the visa policies enacted delays rather than an outright travel 
ban, the restrictions may effectively deter travel by individuals of Pakistani 
descent, and the U.S. State Department has expressed this concern to the 
Indian government.  Its official statement is as follows: 
 The U.S. Department of State is aware that the Government of India 
imposes different policies and requirements with regard to visa issuance 
to applicants with Pakistani heritage, including U.S. citizens of Pakistani 
ancestry. The Department has raised its concerns with the Embassy of 
India in Washington, and the U.S. Embassy has also discussed the issue 
with officials of the Government of India in New Delhi. 
 Unfortunately, the State Department is limited in its influence on 
foreign government visa and immigration actions. Visas for travel to India 
are issued only by Indian authorities and are entirely under the purview of 
Indian laws, regulations, and procedures.  It is the sovereign prerogative 
of any country—including India and the United States—to issue or deny 
entry visas and to set the terms under which those decisions will be 
made.21 
The foregoing statement reveals the conundrum created by the Indian visa 
policy.  On the one hand, the visa policy offends an American principle of 
equal citizenship that the State Department is eager to defend.  On the other, 
the Indian policy exercises the sovereign prerogative to regulate entry, a 
prerogative that the United States not only recognizes with respect to India, 
but also strongly desires to preserve for itself. 
The long history of enmity and suspicion between India and Pakistan, 
dating nearly to the countries’ births, refreshed through multiple wars and 
border crises, and exploited by nationalist movements in both countries, has 
rendered each state vigilant to infiltration by the other.22  The fear of 
infiltration has been heightened by the commonality of racial phenotype, 
language, and religious and cultural practices among citizens of both 
countries—the natural consequence of the Partition of British colonial India 
into the modern states of India and Pakistan.23  But the Headley case 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Nisha Biswal, Response to Twitter Question on Indian Visa’s, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
ST.:  BUREAU S. & CENT. ASIAN AFF. (Jan. 27, 2012, 4:06 PM), https://www.facebook.com/
notes/us-department-of-state-bureau-of-south-and-central-asian-affairs/response-to-twitter-
question-on-indian-visas/284915471568447. 
 22. See, e.g., YASMIN KHAN, THE GREAT PARTITION 195 (2007) (“A natural corollary to 
the empirical confusions surrounding Pakistan’s territorial extent and Pakistan’s intrinsic 
meaning was that it took a long time for people to come to grips with the idea of India and 
Pakistan as separate sovereign lands . . . .  The system of entry and exit permits, which began 
as a logical attempt to regulate the refugee flow, soon turned into a restrictive administrative 
regime which became self-sustaining.  Now the aim was to keep out terrorists and enemies 
of the state . . . .  Most of all, the governments needed to pin down precisely who was an 
Indian and who was a Pakistani.  There was no room for ambiguities or uncertain gray 
areas.”). 
 23. See id. at 81 (noting that the Punjab region before Partition “had its own distinctive 
culture and its own strategic importance, and was both the birthplace of Sikhism and home to 
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introduced the specter of a different kind of enemy to the Indian state:  one 
who could pass not as Indian—a challenge with which the Indian security 
apparatus has decades of experience—but as American. 
The Headley rules reflect an anxiety shared by the West after the attacks 
of September 11, 2001:  fear of the non-terrorist-looking terrorists, a 
category that is itself overdetermined by more than a decade of racial, 
religious, and national associations with terrorism.  The Headley case is an 
example of the adaptive enemy, adjusting its tactics in response to 
antiterrorism measures that rely on traditional forms of profiling.  By this 
account, the Headley rules are the (Indian) state’s counter-adaptation, 
deploying national origin and ancestry where racial phenotype, religious 
identification, language, and nationality—as distinct from national origin—
prove insufficient markers of terrorist threat. 
Although created in response to the Headley affair, the Indian visa policy 
has been enacted against a backdrop of longstanding suspicion of Pakistan, 
which, the policy suggests, has helped to construct Pakistani as not just a 
nationality, but also an ethnicity.  The assimilation of dual nationals into the 
category of Pakistani citizens is less troubling in this regard, since the 
maintenance of Pakistani citizenship reflects a choice of the dual national to 
retain affiliation with, and loyalty to, the Pakistani state.  The ascription of 
Pakistani identity down to the second, or even third, generation of a 
Pakistani national, however, transforms the nationality into an ethnic 
attribution—this attribution descends automatically, even to an individual 
who is one-fourth of Pakistani origin (and even if that Pakistani origin 
precedes the existence of Pakistan itself).24  By this account, “Pakistan” is 
rendered an immutable characteristic and a permanent threat, requiring 
constant Indian vigilance.  Moreover, the ascription of Pakistani ethnicity 
on the basis of bloodline posits a fundamentally ethnic vision of not only 
Pakistani citizenship, but by implication, Indian citizenship as well. 
The Indian construction of Pakistani ethnicity is inextricable from 
Muslim identity, given the virtual equation of Pakistan and Islam in the 
Indian imagination.  Such an equation is to be expected, as Pakistan was 
formed as a Muslim homeland in the subcontinent, and the state has 
engaged in decades of religiously based self-construction and differentiation 
from the Hindu-majority India, even as India has experimented with Hindu 
nationalism.25  The recurrent entanglement of Pakistan and India in 
 
a closely knitted Punjabi-speaking population of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims”).  For a 
general introduction to the history and politics of Partition, see RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA 
AFTER GANDHI 19–51 (2007). 
 24. See, e.g., Visa to Persons of Pakistani Origin, supra note 18.  The text plainly 
reveals that Pakistani origin is a determination based on “citizenship” (rather than the racial 
or ethnic status) of the applicant’s parents and grandparents).   Furthermore, the description 
of Pakistani as a category of ethnicity within South Asia is in many respects inapposite, as 
more traditionally defined, sub-national ethnic groups exist across the Pakistani-Indian 
border.  For example, Punjabis—the most populous ethnic group in Pakistan—exist in both 
countries by virtue of Partition, and share a common language, pre-independence history, 
and cultural traditions, notwithstanding their religious differences. 
 25. The history of Indian and Pakistani constructions of national identity predicated on 
religious affiliation is long and varied—indeed, coextensive with the formal existence of 
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Kashmir likewise has fortified an understanding of Pakistani ethnicity as 
fundamentally Islamic.  Thus, the “Islamic threat” of the Pakistani is not a 
post-9/11 construction, but instead has been an indigenous, longstanding 
feature of Indo-Pak relations, a fact that is supported by the broadly held 
view that the Mumbai attacks featured the involvement of the Pakistani 
state (and, in particular, elements of the ISI), rather than non-state actors 
alone.26 
Notably, the tightening of visa restrictions with respect to Americans of 
Pakistani descent has been accompanied by a relaxation of restrictions with 
respect to the Indian diaspora.  Through a series of policy initiatives 
designed to attract diasporic investment in India, the state has created 
special visa pathways for foreign nationals of Indian origin.  Most recently, 
in 2003, India introduced the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) status, which 
grants various benefits, including a “multiple entry, multiple purpose, life-
long visa for visiting India,”27 freedom from the ordinary requirement to 
register with immigration authorities, the ability to hold property, and 
preferential treatment for adoption from India.28  And while its name 
 
those two countries. See, e.g., KHAN supra note 22, at 175–76 (“[A]s refugees arrived in 
India and Pakistan they were encouraged to see themselves in a new light—to set aside their 
hardships momentarily and to appreciate that they now, after all, independent citizens of free 
countries . . . .  [In Pakistan, t]he victims of Partition violence were called shahids and 
bathed in the language of martyrdom . . . .  Partition quickly became repackaged as a war of 
liberation . . . .  In northern India, the Hindu Right, particularly the RSS [Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh] and the Hindu Mahasabha, which had played such a provocative role 
in the months leading up to Partition, and had been hand in glove with violent rioters all 
along, now swung firmly behind the refugee cause.”).  For a brief introduction to current 
controversies over Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism, and Narendra Modi, see Sambuddha 
Mitra Mustafi, What Makes Narendra Modi a Middle-Class Hero?, N.Y. TIMES, (May 16, 
2013, 1:45 AM), http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/what-makes-narendra-modi-a-
middle-class-hero/. See also Victor Mallet & Barney Jopson, US To End Boycott of India’s 
Narendra Modi Ahead of Election, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014, 5:14 AM), http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/526c00d2-92d3-11e3-8018-00144feab7de.html#axzz2tv3RfA4X. 
 26. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 27. Overseas Citizenship of India Scheme, MINISTRY OVERSEAS INDIAN AFF., 
http://moia.gov.in/services.aspx?id1=35&id=m3&idp=35&mainid=23 (last visited Mar. 25, 
2014). 
 28. A registered OCI is entitled to “parity with Non-Resident Indians in respect of all 
facilities available to them in economic, financial and educational fields except in matters 
relating to the acquisition of agricultural or plantation properties.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In particular, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs indicates that OCIs 
enjoy the following benefits:   
a. Parity with Non-Resident Indians in the matter of inter-country adoption of 
Indian children; 
b. Parity with resident Indian nationals in matters of tariffs in domestic air fares; 
c.  Parity with domestic Indian visitors in respect of entry fee for visiting national 
parks and wildlife sanctuaries in India; 
d. Parity with non-resident Indians in respect of: 
i. Entry fees for visiting the national monuments, historical sites and 
museums in India; 
ii. Practicing the following professions in India . . .  :   
 Doctors, dentists, nurses and pharmacists;  
 Advocates; 
 Architects; and  
 Chartered Accountants; and 
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purports to afford these benefits to “Citizen[s] of India,” the OCI status is in 
fact reserved for foreign nationals of Indian descent, thus blurring the 
traditional citizen-noncitizen dichotomy, providing a qualified form of dual 
citizenship, and introducing a multiplicity of state citizenship practices. 
In fact, the definition of OCI mirrors almost exactly India’s definition of 
Pakistani descent, suggesting that foreign nationals of Pakistani descent are 
viewed by the Indian state as “Overseas Citizens of Pakistan.”29  Under a 
2005 law, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act,30 OCI status may be granted 
to any individual who was eligible for Indian citizenship on the date that the 
Indian constitution became effective (January 26, 1950), belonged to 
territories that became India at Partition (August 15, 1947), or became 
citizens after enactment of the constitution.31  OCI status is also available to 
individuals whose parents or grandparents meet one of these three 
requirements.32  Those who have ever held Pakistani or Bangladeshi 
citizenship are ineligible.33  Thus, “Indianness” is constructed to extend 
back up to three generations, the same as India’s construction of the 
Pakistani.  The Indian and the Pakistani are thus constructed as each other’s 
inverse—as essential, immutable, and oppositional categories, recalling 
Etienne Balibar’s characterization of the “lesson of alterity,” according to 
which modern conceptions of citizenship rely upon “otherness as an 
indispensable element of its own identity, its virtuality, its ‘power.’”34 
The legal inscription of Indian citizenship is inextricable from Partition.  
The first definitions of Indian citizenship, in the constitution of 1950, give 
substantial attention to the granting of citizenship to migrants from 
Pakistan.35  Indeed, the citizenship chapter of the constitution establishes 
the template for determining India’s contemporary understanding of the 
Pakistani and the OCI construction of the Indian.  The constitution reflects 
multiple approaches to citizenship:  jus soli, jus sanguinis, and a partial 
 
e. Entitlement to appear for the All India Pre-Medical Test or such other tests to 
make them eligible for admission in pursuance of the provisions contained in 
the relevant Acts. 
Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. 2005, No. 32, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India). 
 31. Id. § 4(a)(i)–(iii). 
 32. Id. § 4(a)(iv). 
 33. Id. § 4(b). 
 34. Sandro Mezzadra, Citizen and Subject:  A Postcolonial Constitution for the 
European Union?, 1 SITUATIONS:  PROJECT RADICAL IMAGINATION 31, 31 (2006), 
http://ojs.gc.cuny.edu/index.php/situations/article/view/22/31 (translating ETIENNE BALIBAR, 
L’EUROPE, L’AMÉRIQUE, LA GUERRE:  RÉFLEXIONS SUR LA MÉDIATION EUROPÉENE 38–39 
(2003) (“À la leçon d’ordre public issue de l’histoire européenne s’en ajoute ainsi une autre, 
qu’on pourrait appeler une leçon d’altérité, ou une reconnaissance (même hésitante, 
contrainte, conflictuelle) par l’Europe de l’altérité comme composante indispensable de sa 
propre identité, de sa propre virtualité, en clair de sa propre «puissance».”)). 
 35. See Anupama Roy, Between Encompassment and Closure:  The ‘Migrant’ and the 
Citizen in India, 42 CONTRIBUTIONS INDIAN SOC. 219, 222 (2008) (“[Partition is] the primary 
context within which citizenship gets enframed in the Indian Republic.”). 
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deterritorialization.36  First, it confers citizenship on individuals who, at the 
commencement of the constitution, were domiciled in the territory of India, 
and (a) were born in the territory of India, (b) either of whose parents were 
born in the territory of India, or (c) have been “ordinarily resident” in the 
territory of India for a period of five years preceding the commencement of 
the constitution.37  These provisions seek to capture those “found” in India 
soon after its independence38 and render them from colonial subjects to 
citizens of the state.  They do so through a combination of jus soli, jus 
sanguinis, and territorial presence.  Second, the constitution confers 
citizenship on certain migrants to India from territories that became 
Pakistan.  Article 6 of the citizenship chapter deems, as citizens of India, (as 
of the commencement of the constitution) individuals who migrated from 
the territory of Pakistan, and who either themselves, their parents, or their 
grandparents were born in pre-Partition India.39  Article 7 authorizes the 
conferring of citizenship on migrants from India to Pakistan, who 
subsequently returned under permits for resettlement or permanent return.40  
Taken together, Articles 6 and 7 reflect the imperative to contend with the 
massive migration of Partition; migration from Pakistan was, literally, 
constitutive of the nation, and demanded rules to render the trauma and 
messiness of Partition intelligible to the state.  Finally, Article 8 authorizes 
citizenship for “persons of Indian origin” residing outside of India, once 
again employing a trigenerational test:  any individual who was born in the 
territory of pre-independence India, or whose parents or grandparents were 
so born, and who is resident in another country, is eligible for citizenship 
through registration.41  Article 8 represents the most complete 
deterritorialization of citizenship within the constitution, as it requires no 
residence in India, and at its furthest reach, requires only the birth of a 
grandparent within pre-independence India (including the territories that 
became Pakistan).  At the same time, Article 8 also encompassed colonial 
subjects resident in other British colonies, and as such represents an ethnic 
model of citizenship. 
As Valerian Rodrigues has argued, the constitutional structure of 
citizenship was expansive, eschewed strict territorial or ethnic ascription, 
and honored associational choice.42  Associational choice is most clearly 
 
 36. See Anupama Roy, Overseas Indian Citizen:  A New ‘Setubhandan’?, 41 ECON. & 
POL. WEEKLY 1421, 1422 (2006). 
 37. INDIA CONST. art. 5. 
 38. ROY, supra note 2, at 36. 
 39. Article 6 also draws a distinction between those individuals who migrated to India 
before July 19, 1948, and those who migrated on or after that date.  In order to be deemed a 
citizen, an individual in the former category must have been “ordinarily resident in the 
territory of India since the date of his migration . . . .”  Those in the latter category must have 
been registered as a citizen of India before the “commencement” of the Constitution.  
Registration was possible only after a residency of at least six months in duration 
“immediately preceding” the date of application. See INDIA CONST. art. 6. 
 40. Id. art. 7. 
 41. Id. art. 8. 
 42. See Valerian Rodrigues, Citizenship and the Indian Constitution, in CIVIL SOCIETY, 
PUBLIC SPHERE, AND CITIZENSHIP:  DIALOGUES AND PERCEPTIONS 214 (Rajeev Bhargava & 
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reflected in Articles 6 and 7, and yet these provisions are not entirely free of 
ascription.  Rather, the trigenerational eligibility rule still serves to define 
Indian ancestry, even if such ancestry does not automatically confer Indian 
citizenship; only the volitional act of migration to the territory of India, in 
combination with Indian ancestry, results in the conferring of citizenship.  
This same combination of ascription and volition repeats in Article 8, which 
requires that individuals of Indian ancestry—defined, once more, by a 
trigenerational rule—affirmatively apply with the Indian government for 
registration as citizens.43 
The original constitutional structure of Indian citizenship thus reflects 
three distinct foundational concerns:  transforming colonial subjects of 
Great Britain into citizens of the Indian state; incorporating migrants from 
Pakistan in the period of Partition into India; and demarcating Indian 
citizenship from Pakistani citizenship (and, by extension, India from 
Pakistan).  These goals are met through an imbricated system of jus soli and 
jus sanguinis, ascription and volition.  By virtue of the histories of British 
colonialism, the independence movement that cleaved India, and the mass 
migration of Partition, the citizenship moves expressed in the constitution 
were essential to nascent India’s national project.  Unsurprisingly, the 
constitution’s foundational definitions of citizenship prefigure the state’s 
contemporary definitions of Indian and Pakistani citizenship. 
As Anupama Roy has shown, the emergence of OCI status is consistent 
with a trend in India toward an ethnic model of citizenship.44  Roy observes 
that the constitution conceived of citizenship in both ethnic and 
associational terms, conjuring a membership status that included both a 
territorially defined class and a migrant population that elected to join that 
class.45  The ethnic dimension of Indian citizenship has, however, grown 
considerably in recent years.  The Citizenship Act of 1955 provided for 
unrestricted jus soli citizenship for anyone born in India from the date of 
enactment of the constitution onward, but a 1986 amendment to the Act, 
created to restrict the granting of citizenship to children of migrants from 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Africa, limited jus soli to those with at least one 
Indian citizen parent.46  A 2003 amendment, which also created the OCI 
status, further restricted jus soli to individuals whose parents were both 
Indian citizens, or to those with only one citizen parent, so long as the other 
parent was not an “illegal migrant” at the time of the individual’s birth.47  
 
Helmut Reifeld eds., 2005) (noting that “the draft articles [of the constitution], both as they 
were initially proposed, and in their final version too, had some pronounced features which 
could be termed secular, understood as non-preference to any and inclusion of all relevant 
communities or groups,” and, further, “[w]hile accepting the fact that people were embedded 
in identities, [the constitution] grounded citizenship on principles that, while not reducible to 
them, were at the same time related to [those identities]”); see also ROY, supra note 2, at 39–
40. 
 43. See INDIA CONST. art. 8. 
 44. See generally Roy, supra note 36. 
 45. Roy, supra note 36, at 1421–22. 
 46. See ROY, supra note 2, at 138; Roy, supra note 36, at 1422. 
 47. “Illegal migrant” is defined as “a foreigner who has entered into India (i) without a 
valid passport or other travel documents and such other document or authority as may be 
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Meanwhile, a 1992 amendment expanded upon the Act’s original grant of 
patrilineal jus sanguinis citizenship by making citizenship available to 
individuals born outside of India to an Indian citizen father, even if the 
father himself only acquired citizenship through descent.48  The trend is 
thus toward a restriction on citizenship by birth and an expansion of 
citizenship by descent.  Citizenship by descent, in turn, forces a 
convergence of Indian ethnicity and Indian citizenship, as evident from the 
intent to exclude Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, and Africans in the 1986 
amendment—once more reviving Balibar’s “lesson of otherness”—and as 
reinforced by the ascription of a deterritorialized citizenship to the OCI.49 
The introduction of the OCI status in 2003 is a particular kind of 
deterritorialization of citizenship.  Deterritorialization is typically associated 
with the claiming or granting of rights by or to undocumented workers or 
other irregular migrants, supplanting the privity between state and citizen 
on which traditional notions of citizenship rely with a notion of informal 
social contract borne of territorial presence and civic practice.50  The OCI 
program works in the other direction, extending the status-granting, 
identity-making reach of the state outside of its territorial boundary in order 
to recapture a diaspora and harness it for national gain.  Both moves should 
be expected in the current moment of globalization, as states compete for 
the benefits of migration and simultaneously seek to insulate themselves 
from its costs. 
As Roy points out, the OCI category was initially limited to people of 
Indian origin in North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, and Thailand, prompting Fatima Meer, a South African, to dub it 
a “[d]ollar and pound citizenship.”51  But the cultural nationalism of the 
OCI program is at least as strong as the economic.  Even when the program 
was expanded in 2005, it excluded citizens of Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
thus recapitulating the foundational definition of Indian citizenship.  But as 
Roy writes: 
 
prescribed by or under any law in that behalf; or (ii) with a valid passport or other travel 
documents and such other document or authority as may be prescribed by or under any law 
in that behalf but remains therein beyond the permitted period of time”. The Citizenship 
(Amendment) Act, 2003, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2004 (India).  
 48. See Rodrigues, supra note 42, at 216 (noting the overarching trend toward more 
restrictive citizenship criteria and underscoring that “successive amendments to [the 
Citizenship] Act narrowly circumscribed birth as entitling one to citizenship, and birth came 
emphatically to be qualified by ethnic belonging.  The open and inclusive approach to 
citizenship reflected in the constitution gave way to a pronounced sense of insularity”). 
 49. See ROY, supra note 2, at 136–37 (noting the increase in scholarly theorization of the 
“changed socio-historical realities of an increasingly globalized, interdependent, and inter-
connected world, characterized by transnational migrations and multicultural populations 
rather than by bounded national communities,” which give rise to an apparently 
“transcendental” citizenship); see also BALIBAR, supra note 34. 
 50. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Repositioning of Citizenship:  Emergent Subjects and 
Spaces for Politics, 46 BERKELEY J. SOC. 4, 5–12 (2002). 
 51. C. Rammanohar Reddy, Citizenship with Dollars and Pounds, HINDU (Jan. 19, 
2003), http://www.hindu.com/mag/2003/01/19/stories/2003011900230300.htm. 
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Not only did the OCI then sustain the original contexts of nation-state 
citizenship framed at the time of Partition, it also manifested the dominant 
political and ideological contexts of Hindutva [Hindu nationalism] within 
which the category was made effective, the official process of instituting 
the category having been completed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
dominated National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government . . . .  [T]he 
overseas citizenship of India was hegemonically marked, constituting all 
persons of Indian origin, wherever in the world they were, as Hindus, 
since their punya bhumi [homeland] remained India.52 
By this account, the Indian’s other is not the Pakistani, but the Muslim, a 
familiar theme in the subcontinent dating back to Partition.53 
The Muslim in India has been, and continues to be, a vexing figure.  In 
the immediate aftermath of Partition, Muslims were deemed “suspect as 
open or closet Pakistanis,” having been “too much involved in the Muslim 
League demand for Pakistan:  their sympathies were not likely to change 
overnight, and their loyalty could not be counted upon.”54  Questions of 
loyalty and fears of complicity with Pakistan or infiltration by Pakistanis 
have animated modern Indian history, from Partition to Kashmir to the 
Headley affair.  It is, therefore, among these historical circumstances that 
Indian notions of citizenship—the citizenship of Indians and the citizenship 
of others—must be evaluated.  As the Indian’s other, the Pakistani—nearly 
equated with the Muslim—is a permanent object of suspicion.  Just as the 
physical boundaries of India and Pakistan have been reified, so too have 
Indian and Pakistani identities been reinscribed.  Between the Headley rules 
on the one hand, and the developments in Indian citizenship practices on the 
other, we can see the convergence of national security and cultural 
nationalist concerns, each following a logic of ethnic citizenship.  The 
Pakistani and the Indian are once more opposed through ascriptions of 
citizenship that predate the nationalities as a historical matter, and which 
suggest their essential and permanent nature. 
Differentiation from the Pakistani is thus part of the deep structure of 
citizenship in India.  The contemporary reliance on national origin and 
ancestry is inseparable from the nation-building project of post-
independence India and reflects India’s newly resurgent ethno-national 
model of citizenship.  Rooted in the foundational trauma of Partition, and 
fueled by religious and cultural nationalism within India and Pakistan, the 
imperative to differentiation has assumed new relevance within India 
following September 11 and the Mumbai attacks.  In this context, as at 
Partition, ancestry is constitutive of Indian understandings of citizenship 
rather than antithetical to them.55 
 
 52. Roy, supra note 35, at 239. 
 53. Gyanendra Pandey, Can a Muslim Be an Indian?, 41 COMP. STUD. SOC. & HIST. 608, 
615 (1999). 
 54. Id. 
 55. The figure of the migrant has also been transformed since independence.  Whereas 
Partition created an imperative for the state to identify and incorporate the migrant, this 
moment of incorporation was finite; as the constitution provided, migrants from territory that 
became Pakistan were eligible for citizenship only until the date of commencement of the 
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B.  The Israel Visa Waiver Program Controversy 
In March 2013, companion bills were introduced in the House and 
Senate, both titled the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 
2013.56  With 351 cosponsors in the House57 and fifty-three in the Senate,58 
the bills declare Israel a “major strategic partner”59 of the United States.  
They include provisions for continued support of Israeli defense programs 
and expanded cooperation between the two countries on matters of defense, 
military and sensitive technology-related trade, energy, water, and 
agriculture.  The bills also promote Israel’s inclusion in the Visa Waiver 
Program, engendering considerable opposition because of Israel’s disparate 
treatment of U.S. citizens of Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim descent.60 
The Visa Waiver Program began as a pilot program in 1986.61  Originally 
limited to eight countries,62 it exempts the citizens of program-participant 
countries from the requirement to obtain from the State Department a 
nonimmigrant visa for business or tourist travel to the United States for up 
to ninety days.63  The program has been amended numerous times since 
1986, was made permanent in 2000,64 and has now expanded to include 
 
constitution.  Thus, the constitution established a window of time in which migration was a 
basis for citizenship.  Decades later, migration became oppositional to citizenship rather than 
a pathway to it. See supra note 39; see also Roy, supra note 35, at 234 (describing the Illegal 
Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1983 (India), 
invalidated by Sarbananda Sonawal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 S.C.C. 665 (India), which 
“stressed that ‘special provisions for the detection of such foreigners in Assam and also in 
any other part of India in which such foreigners may be found to have remained illegally’ 
was necessary for ‘protecting the citizens of India’”); id. at 236 (characterizing the supreme 
court decision that struck down the Illegal Migrants Act as itself “manifest[ing] a trend 
towards the entrenchment of a notion of citizenship marked by cultural ascriptions which 
had almost imperceptibly crept into the Citizenship Act with the amendment in 1986”). 
 56. United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013, S. Con. Res. 462, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
 57. H.R.938—United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/938 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See H.R. 938, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); S. 462, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013).  If enacted, 
Israel would be the only country to which this designation would apply. 
 60. See, e.g., Letter from Azadeh N. Shahshahani, President, Nat’l Lawyers Guild, to 
Sen. Barbara Boxer (June 26, 2013), available at http://www.nlginternational.org/report/
NLG_letter-SB_462.pdf; Ali Gharib and George Hale, Critics Fear Visa Waiver for Israel 
Glosses over Discrimination Against Americans, DAILY BEAST (May 16, 2013), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/16/critics-fear-visa-waiver-for-israel-glosses-
over-discrimination-against-americans.html. 
 61. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program was contained in the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 313, 100 Stat. 3359, 3435. 
 62. The first country designated by the U.S. State Department was the United Kingdom, 
on July 1, 1988.  During 1988 and 1989, the following countries were added to the pilot (in 
chronological order):  Japan, France, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands. Visas:  Passports and Visas Not Required for Certain 
Nonimmigrants, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,120 (June 27, 1989) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 41 (2013)). 
 63. 22 C.F.R. § 41.2(1) (2012). 
 64. Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-396, 114 Stat. 1637 (2000) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2012)). 
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thirty-seven countries.65  The requirements for admission to the program 
were amended most recently via the Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007.66  Approximately 40 percent of all overseas 
visitors enter the United States via the program.67  Many countries actively 
seek admission to the program in order to promote tourism and 
commerce.68  It is also understood as an expression of amity between the 
United States and member countries.69 
Whereas visitors to the United States ordinarily must obtain a visa from 
an overseas U.S. consular post and are typically subject to in-person 
interviews and screening and must pay a processing fee, the Visa Waiver 
Program relieves visitors of the documentary, interview, and financial 
burdens attendant to nonimmigrant “B” visas.70  Ordinary visa processing 
takes into account a broad range of factors, including whether the applicant 
meets a ground of inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, the likelihood that the applicant will overstay the visa, and whether the 
applicant is in one of a number of “lookout” databases of people deemed a 
threat to the United States.71  For participating countries, the Visa Waiver 
Program replaces these individualized assessments with a far less onerous 
application process, one that functions effectively as a presumption in favor 
of admission.72  The criteria for admission to the program restrict it to “high 
volume/low risk” countries,73 whose nationals likely would be granted 
visitor visas through the ordinary process, and which otherwise agree to 
forms of cooperation with the United States designed to approximate the 
same security interests as individualized assessments. 
By statute, the program is limited to countries that have historically low 
rates of nonimmigrant visa refusals, adopt certain technologies such as 
machine-readable passports and visa documents that incorporate biometric 
 
 65. The Visa Waiver Program currently designates:  Andorra, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, San 
Marino, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. 8 C.F.R. § 217.2. 
 66. Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 711, 121 Stat. 266, 388 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187).  As the 
Foreign Affairs Manual summarizes, the program has been amended six times, including the 
2007 amendments.  In 1990, the eight-country cap was removed, and the program was 
reauthorized until 1994.  In 1994, the program was reauthorized until 1996, and a 
probationary status for prospective participant countries was added.  In 1996, the 
probationary status option was removed, and the program was reauthorized until 1997.  In 
1998, the program was reauthorized again until 2000, when the Visa Waiver Permanent 
Program Act made the program permanent. 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
MANUAL § 41.2 N10 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
87159.pdf. 
 67. ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32221, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 9 (2014). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 12. 
 70. ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32221, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 13 
(2013). 
 71. SISKIN, supra note 67, at 1. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 9. 
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identifiers, enter into information-sharing agreements with the United States 
regarding loss or theft of passports or possible threats to U.S. security or 
welfare, and accept the streamlined repatriation of its citizens, former 
citizens, and nationals, against whom a final order of removal is issued.74  
In addition, a participating country must offer “reciprocal privileges” to the 
United States,75 and the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation 
with the Department of State, must determine that the law enforcement and 
security interests of the United States would not be undermined by the 
country’s inclusion.76 
Whereas on one level the Visa Waiver Program is merely a matter of 
administrative convenience, for visitors and the countries they visit alike, it 
is also understood as an expression of strategic partnership and amity 
between the United States and member countries.  As President George W. 
Bush stated in 2008 when announcing the addition of the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovakia, and South Korea to the program, “Today’s 
announcement signifies a new chapter in the relationship between the 
United States and your nations.  It is a testament to the strong bonds of 
friendship that unite our people.”77  Unsurprisingly, inclusion of countries 
in the program is an instrument of foreign policy, as reflected in the 
strategic significance of the three former Soviet-bloc countries and South 
Korea, and is understood as such by many countries.78  In 2006, for 
example, then President Vaclav Havel wrote to President Bush urging 
inclusion of the Czech Republic in the program, arguing that doing so 
would “remove what Czechs feel is an unfortunate relic of the Cold War 
that no longer belongs in the modern Czech-U.S. alliance.”79  As a recent 
 
 74. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c) (2012). 
 75. Id. § 1187(a)(2)(A). 
 76. Id. § 1187(c). 
 77. President George W. Bush, Statement by the President on the Visa Waiver Program 
(Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2008/10/
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as a foreign policy tool.  As a Government Accountability Office (GAO) letter to Congress 
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reasons. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-835R, PROCESS FOR ADMITTING 
ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES INTO THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 3 (2006).  In 2005, President Bush 
announced the “Road Map Initiative,” to assist additional countries in meeting the 
requirements to join the program. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-967, VISA 
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PROCESS, AND TO ASSESS AND MITIGATE PROGRAM RISKS 16 (2008).  As the GAO reported in 
2008, “According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), some of these countries 
are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq and have high expectations that they will join the 
program due to their close economic, political, and military ties to the United States.” Id. at 
3.  In 2006, the Senate passed, but did not enact, a comprehensive immigration reform bill 
that included a section to expand the program to countries providing material support to the 
United States or the multilateral forces in Afghanistan or Iraq. Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 413. 
 79. Daniel Griswold, Expand Visa Waiver Program to Qualified Countries, 26 FREE 
TRADE BULL. 3 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/
pdf/FTB-026.pdf (quoting letter on file with author). 
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Congressional Research Service report notes, “[T]he leaders and publics in 
many new EU members, such as Poland, are reportedly unhappy with their 
exclusion from the VWP given their support of controversial U.S. policies 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the fight against terrorism.”80  In many cases, 
inclusion in the program may also serve as an American endorsement of the 
democratic bona fides of participating countries.  For example, a White 
House statement entitled “U.S.-Chile Partnership” notes the “deep historical 
partnership” between the two countries, as “close partners and vibrant 
democracies,” and includes the State Department’s nomination of Chile to 
the Visa Waiver Program in a list of cooperation agreements.81  Thus, the 
symbolic value of the program, and not just the ease of travel it affords, 
makes it a coveted status for many countries.  In light of the foreign policy 
role that the Visa Waiver Program has played historically, it is not 
surprising that the proposal to include Israel in the program would be 
included in a bill designed to promote Israel as a “major strategic 
partner.”82 
The legitimizing effects of the Visa Waiver Program are embedded in its 
reciprocity requirement.  The statutory requirement that member countries 
provide “reciprocal privileges” to U.S. citizens and nationals implies an 
equality of status among Americans and the citizens of other countries.  As 
Havel wrote in his letter to President Bush regarding inclusion of the Czech 
Republic in the program, “It . . . allows you to demonstrate to an 
emancipated and self-confident ally the renowned U.S. spirit of equality 
and fair play.”83  At a minimum, reciprocity in the context of the Visa 
Waiver Program means “visa-free travel” for U.S. citizens and those of the 
member country.84  But the broad language of the statute—requiring 
“reciprocal privileges to citizens and nationals of the United States”—
implies that visa-free travel must also be travel free of discrimination, 
because citizenship, by its liberal meaning, does not permit differentiation 
among its members, the language of the statute necessarily requires the 
extension of reciprocal privileges to all U.S. citizens.85 
Although Israel would not meet the program’s current visa refusal rate 
requirement—the statute requires a rate of no more than 3 percent,86 and the 
 
 80. SISKIN, supra note 70 at 13; see also Craig Whitlock, Poland’s Leader Hopes To 
Gain from Support of U.S. Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at A15. 
 81. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet:  U.S.-Chile Partnership (June 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-us-chile-
partnership. 
 82. See United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013, H.R. 938, 113th Cong. 
§ 3 (2013) (“Congress declares that Israel is a major strategic partner of the United States.”). 
 83. Griswold, supra note 79, at 3. 
 84. See, e.g., 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 66. 
 85. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 86. The statute requires either (a) a visa refusal rate of less than 2 percent during the two 
previous fiscal years combined and less than 2.5 percent in each of the previous two fiscal 
years, or (b) a visa refusal rate during the immediately previous fiscal year of less than 3 
percent. Id. § 1187(c)(2)(A). 
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rate for Israel in fiscal year 2013 was 9.7 percent87—Israel’s treatment of 
American Muslims and Americans of Arab and Palestinian descent has 
proven the main obstacle to inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program because 
of the reciprocity requirement.  For decades, advocates have documented 
concerns with Israel’s treatment of Muslim Americans, Arab Americans, 
and Palestinian Americans.88  These have included “complaints of hundreds 
of American[s] of Arab descent who, upon entering Israel or the Occupied 
Territories, have reported being:  detained for hours of humiliating 
questioning; forced against their will to secure a Palestinian passport; strip 
searched; forced to surrender cameras, computers, or phones (some of 
which have been destroyed or not returned); or denied entry and forced to 
buy a return ticket back to the U.S.”89  In June 2013, sixteen members of 
Congress wrote a letter to the Israeli ambassador to the U.S. expressing 
concern that Israel was “‘disproportionately singling out, detaining and 
denying entry to Arab and Muslim Americans.’”90 
The U.S. State Department similarly has documented unequal treatment 
of U.S. citizens.  In its country report for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, 
the State Department begins with a statement of its commitment to equal 
citizenship:  “The U.S. government seeks equal treatment and freedom to 
travel for all U.S. citizens regardless of national origin or ethnicity.”91  Yet 
whereas Israeli-American nationals are treated by Israel as Israeli at the port 
of entry, the report continues, “U.S. citizens who are or may be Palestinian-
American (PA) dual nationals are treated as Palestinian nationals at the port 
of entry.”92  Moreover, “[t]hose with extensive travel to Muslim countries 
or U.S. citizens whom Israeli authorities suspect of being of Arab, Middle 
 
 87. Adjusted Refusal Rate—B-Visas Only by Nationality, Fiscal Year 2013, 
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/Non-Immigrant-
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 88. See, e.g., James Zogby, Congress Should Not Reward Israel with Visa Waivers, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/congress-
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Munayyer, A Lopsided U.S. Visa-Waiver, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2013, at 9. 
 90. See Friction Expected on Israel-US Visa Measure, BOS. GLOBE (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/07/16/congress-administration-disagree-
israeli-visas/Al9SiaeBJzAPc4qB7WDIRJ/story.html. 
 91. Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, U.S. PASSPORTS & INT’L TRAVEL, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/country/israel.html (last updated Feb. 6, 
2014). 
 92. Id. 
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Eastern, or Muslim origin may face additional questioning by immigration 
and border authorities.”93 
The prefatory statement of principle in the State Department report 
announces the issue as one of discrimination on the basis of national origin 
and ancestry.94  In fact, national origin and ancestry discrimination are 
operating in at least two distinct ways.  First, Israel ascribes Palestinian 
identity not only to those who hold both a U.S. passport and a PA 
identification, but to those U.S. citizens who may be eligible for a PA 
identification, even if they do not possess one.95  As the report states, 
“Israeli authorities consider anyone who has parents or grandparents who 
were born or lived in the West Bank or Gaza to have a claim to a PA ID.”96  
The effect is for the Israeli government, and not the Palestinian Authority, 
to determine, on the basis of ancestry, who is Palestinian, and by 
implication, for the Israeli government rather than the United States to 
determine who is an American citizen.  Second, according to the State 
Department, Israel gives enhanced scrutiny to U.S. citizens “whom Israeli 
authorities suspect of being of Arab, Middle Eastern, or Muslim origin.”97  
Thus, even if a U.S citizen may not actually be eligible for a PA 
identification card, the mere fact of Arab, Middle Eastern, or Muslim 
heritage may trigger disparate treatment. 
Even Senator Barbara Boxer, who introduced the United States-Israel 
Strategic Partnership Act in the Senate, acknowledges Israeli discrimination 
against Arab Americans’ visa and admission determinations.98  She has 
defended the bill on the basis of its requirement that Israel exercise a 
“reasonable effort” to prevent discrimination against all American 
citizens.99  Indeed, she argues that including Israel in the Visa Waiver 
Program would provide the United States leverage to end such 
discriminatory treatment.  However, as the bill specifically qualifies the 
requirement of a “reasonable effort” with the phrase “without jeopardizing 
the security of the State of Israel,”100 Israel may be able to justify and 
continue its current policies under those conditions. 
Citizenship determination has long been understood as the sole 
prerogative of the sovereign.101  In this instance, Israel’s ascription of 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. “PA ID holders, as well as persons believed to have claim to a PA ID by virtue of 
ancestry, will be treated for immigration purposes as residents of the West Bank and Gaza, 
regardless of whether they also hold U.S. citizenship.” Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. See SISKIN, supra note 67, at 15. 
 99. Id.  The bill states, in full, that the Secretary of State must certify that Israel “has 
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 100. S. 462 § 9(2). 
 101. Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694, 694 
(2011) (“As a matter of traditional doctrine, international law has had little to say about the 
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Palestinian identity, combined with its policy of selective recognition of 
dual nationality, implies an Israeli claim of sovereignty over the Palestinian 
territories, which, while offensive to the aspirations of Palestinian 
nationhood, is not inconsistent with the contemporary political reality. 
Notably, it is Palestinian identity, as evidenced by eligibility (real or 
assumed) for a Palestinian Authority identification card, and not Palestinian 
nationality, that Israel ascribes.102  While the existence of the PA 
identification card may be in anticipation of Palestinian nationhood—the 
cards are issued pursuant to the self-governance provisions of the Oslo 
Accords103—the fact of Palestinian non-nationhood, and Israel’s effective 
exercise of sovereignty over the Palestinian territories, is reinscribed by its 
ascription of Palestinian identity.  The Palestinian Authority might 
ultimately issue the identification cards, but it does so subject to Israeli 
control. 
Echoing the duality of India’s visa and citizenship policy, Israel’s 
constriction of the citizenship of Americans of Palestinian, Arab, and 
Muslim origin coexists with the liberal extension of citizenship to Jews 
under Israel’s Law of Return.104  A foundational instrument of the Israeli 
national project, the Law of Return reflects an ethnic model of citizenship 
that dates back nearly to the creation of the state; it has served as a principal 
vehicle for fulfilling the state’s ambition to be a Jewish homeland.105  As 
Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled argue, ethno-nationalism has been one of 
three predominant strands in Israeli citizenship practice and theory, 
counterbalanced by democratic commitments and mediated by 
republicanism.106  Whereas republicanism defines that nation—and thus the 
citizen—on the basis of territory, ethno-nationalism defines the nation on 
ethnic grounds.  In the subcontinent, the cleaving of colonial India into two 
bordering nations has led to ethnic differentiation on both sides of the 
border.  Likewise, the establishment of the state of Israel as a Jewish 
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homeland demanded differentiation from bordering Palestinian and Arab 
territories, and therefore peoples. 
It is a verity that the Jewish identity of Israel is a central—if contested—
conceit of the nation.  (In this regard, Israel’s ethno-nationalism bears a 
stronger similarity to that of Pakistan, itself conceived of as a homeland for 
a religious minority, than to that of India.)  As in the case of India, then, 
Israel’s normative conception of citizenship is inextricable from the self-
conception of the nation and the nation-building project.  By this account, 
citizenship is culturally specific. 
II.  VISA POLICY AS SITE OF CONTEST:  A CLASH OF CITIZENSHIPS 
Visa programs—the regulated interchange of citizens by states—
represent a point of contact, and therefore potential conflict, between 
competing understandings of citizenship.  Whereas citizenship is, 
fundamentally, a national status, visa programs subject citizens of one 
country to the values, including the citizenship values, of another.  The 
ethno-nationalist dimensions of India’s visa policy toward Americans of 
Pakistani descent and Israel’s treatment of Americans of Palestinian, Arab, 
and Muslim descent pose a fundamental challenge to American conceptions 
of equal citizenship.  Indeed, the seemingly mundane, bureaucratic 
determination of permission to visit made by one state may devalue the 
privileges of citizenship of another.  In the cases of India and Israel with 
respect to U.S. citizens, the liberal conception of citizenship as unalloyed 
and indivisible is tested and even nullified.  U.S. policy in response is 
therefore not merely a matter of protecting the interests of individual 
American citizens—a core obligation of a state to its citizens—but of 
protecting an American conception of citizenship itself. 
While the history of American citizenship practices is rife with 
exclusionary practices—one need only recall Dred Scott v. Sandford,107 the 
exclusion of women from basic citizenship rights,108 and the period of 
Asian exclusion, culminating in the Immigration Act of 1924,109 which 
barred admission of Asian immigrants because they were racially 
“ineligible to citizenship”110—ethnic assimilation predominates in 
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contemporary state discourse and practice.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
liberal granting of jus soli citizenship is itself an assimilationist instrument, 
promising that nationality-based distinctions will last no more than a 
generation, and committing the nation to territoriality as a predominant, 
though not exclusive, basis for citizenship.111  As Peter Spiro has argued, 
territorial presence has long served not only to define the political 
community, but to constitute national identity.112  National origin and 
ancestry discrimination are explicitly prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,113 the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,114 and U.S. 
Supreme Court case law on equal protection115 and interpreting Section 
1981.116  Of course, national origin and ancestry-based discrimination 
persists, notwithstanding these formal legal protections, and concerns have 
been especially acute in the antiterrorism and national security contexts, 
particularly in the years following the September 11 attacks.117  But the 
assimilationist ideology is today foundational to the self-conception of the 
country as a “nation of immigrants.”118  That ideology, in turn, drives a 
normative vision of citizenship that is significantly more civic and 
classically liberal than the ethno-nationalist strands visible in contemporary 
Indian and Israeli citizenship practices. 
In the contemporary moment, then, the United States occupies a different 
normative space regarding citizenship than India and Israel.  The difference 
is profound, not only in its practical effects—that is, the differential 
treatment of U.S. citizens—but conceptually.  In the liberal conception, the 
citizen is an abstract, universal figure who obtains equality by virtue of the 
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state’s neutrality as to all citizens; the status as citizen is dispositive, and 
trumps all other affiliations, whether claimed or ascribed.119  Such an 
understanding renders the notion of “equal citizenship” redundant, for 
citizenship is, by definition, a condition of equality.  T.H. Marshall’s notion 
of the image of an ideal citizenship goes further and posits citizenship as a 
developing institution,120 or as John Hoffman terms it, a “momentum 
concept” that evolves over time and provides a metric of societal 
progress.121  For Marshall, citizenship is a dynamic heuristic for 
egalitarianism.  But whether static or dynamic, citizenship is, in the liberal 
understanding, an unimpeachable claim of equal membership, treatment, 
and right.  To peer beyond the mantle of citizenship, and to value kinship, 
race, gender, ancestry, or other affiliations, is anathema. 
Whereas the liberal model of citizenship demands a radical agnosticism 
of states as to its citizens’ differing conceptions of the good, ethno-
nationalist models conceive of the citizen as an embodiment of the state.  
Cultural homogeneity binds citizens to one another and to the state; the 
identity of the citizen and the state converge.  As Shafir and Peled write: 
In the ethno-nationalist, or völkish, approach, citizenship is not an 
expression of individual rights or of contribution to the common good, but 
of membership in a homogenous descent group . . . .  The community, in 
this view, is not conceived of as existing outside the state, or over against 
it in some way, but rather as expressed in and embodied by the state.  
Thus, the tension between the individual and the state, or between the 
community and the state, that characterizes liberal and republican 
thinking, respectively, is absent from the ethno-nationalist discourse.  
Instead, this discourse integrates non-political, cultural elements into the 
concept of citizenship.  It portrays nations as radically different from one 
another because their members possess distinct cultural markers, such as 
language, religion, and history.  Since nations are thus inscribed into the 
identity of their members, ethnic nationalism denies the possibility of 
cultural assimilation . . . .122 
A citizenship based upon the inscription of the nation in the identity of the 
ethno-citizen enables deterritorialization.  The fact of shared descent is 
durable, if not permanent, across time and geography.  The third generation 
person of Indian descent is claimed by the state as an Indian, and the Jew is 
presumptively Israeli.  In both cases, actual citizenship requires a volitional 
act on the part of the individual, but that state has already consented.  In 
contrast, the liberal model abhors kinship- or descent-based particularity 
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and conceives of citizenship as a universalizing move, a state technology 
that obliterates such status.123 
This is not to suggest that either the United States on the one hand, or 
India and Israel on the other, represent pure forms of any one citizenship 
model.  Rather, each reflects a significant degree of hybridity.  This is 
reflected by the fact that the United States provides both jus soli and jus 
sanguinis citizenship.  As Christian Joppke has argued, “All states are 
‘ethnic’ in the sense that birth is the usual way of becoming a member of a 
state:  ‘states are primarily communities of descent.’”124  Thus, although the 
principle of jus soli, entrenched in the Fourteenth Amendment, enables 
cultural assimilation, it does not ensure it.  Rather, the assimilationist 
capacity of jus soli depends upon immigration policy, patterns, and 
histories.  In the period of Asian exclusion, then, when Asian immigration 
came to a standstill, and in the era of national origin quotas,125 jus soli 
consolidated an ethnic notion of citizenship rather than undoing it.126  And 
while immigration patterns have shifted dramatically since 1965, existing 
demographics, combined with jus soli and jus sanguinis practices, 
perpetuate dominant ethnic characteristics.  Likewise, India and Israel’s 
citizenship practices are not purely ethno-nationalist, but instead interweave 
ethnic, civic, and republican attributes.  As Joppke notes, “Tied to a 
territory and based on a personal substratum that reproduces itself 
intergenerationally, the modern state is a fundamentally dualistic institution, 
being territorial and ethnic at the same time.”127 
This commonality notwithstanding, the ideological centrality of ethnic 
assimilation to the American national project stands in sharp contrast to the 
foundational and contemporary significance of ethno-nationalism in India’s 
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and Israel’s respective national self-conceptions.  The modern overlay of 
national security considerations, and the concern for a kind of citizenship 
perfidy, may provide a new rationale for differentiation as among the 
citizenship of others, but as Part I demonstrates, the imperative to 
differentiation in India and Israel is longstanding. 
This is not to downplay the salience of the current national security 
moment for contemporary citizenship practices.  Rather, the post–
September 11 incarnation of national security concern has placed 
significant pressure on liberal notions of citizenship, testing their limits and 
creating opportunities for either the reassertion of liberal principles or, 
alternatively, their mutation.  The United States has hardly been immune 
from such pressure.  In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the 
government targeted not only Arab, Muslim, and South Asian foreign 
nationals for a range of surveillance and enforcement practices, but U.S. 
citizens of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian descent as well.128  In 2011, the 
Associated Press and other media discovered a New York Police 
Department surveillance program, operating since 2001, which “has 
mapped, monitored, and analyzed American Muslim daily life throughout 
New York City, and even its surrounding states.”129 
Moreover, it appears that the United States at one point proposed the 
same kind of intra-citizenship differentiation on the basis of national 
security concerns—in the context of the Visa Waiver Program, no less—
that India and Israel practice today.  In 2007, the New York Times reported 
that then Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff was negotiating 
with the British government “on how to curb the access of British citizens 
of Pakistani origin to the United States.”130  Although the article is vague 
about the “visa loophole” that the United States sought to close,131 it can 
only refer to the Visa Waiver Program, of which the United Kingdom is a 
member.132  According to the New York Times, one option under 
consideration was “to single out Britons of Pakistani origin, requiring them 
to make visa applications for the United States.”133  Thus, if the report is 
accurate, the United States sought, in the name of national security, to peel 
back the citizenship of certain Britons, based solely upon their national 
origin.  Such efforts, if in fact made, did not succeed, but the story suggests 
anew the precariousness of equal citizenship, the seductiveness of ethno-
nationalist policies in the current national security moment, and the need for 
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state vigilance in international visa policy and practice to protect not only 
the state’s citizens, but the nation’s conception of citizenship. 
CONCLUSION 
Returning to the controversies around India’s and Israel’s visa policies 
with respect to U.S. citizens, this is not a story of clean hands on the part of 
one state and unclean on the part of another.  Rather, citizenship practices, 
like citizenship theories, are multiple, dynamic, overlapping, and often 
internally contradictory.134  And yet, some theories have greater hold on a 
nation than others, owing to each nation’s unique history, geography, and 
ideological practices and commitments.  As Roy argues, “Citizenship is . . . 
inextricably tied with the processes of state formation.”135  Visa policies 
such as those discussed here bring these differences into relief and pit 
national citizenship ideologies in contest with one another. 
Visa policy is bureaucratic, high volume, and oftentimes tedious.  But 
understanding the controversies surrounding the Indian and Israeli policies 
as implicating not merely the travel interests of individual citizens and the 
security interests of the state, but the normative visions of citizenship itself, 
opens opportunities for more meaningful development of citizenship 
practices.  Recognizing the cultural specificities of citizenship theory and 
practice may, in turn, enable the development of shared understandings.  It 
is from a place of ethical particularity, then, that the universality promised 
by equal citizenship may be best achieved. 
 
 
 134. See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 106, at 6 (“In most societies two or more discourses 
of citizenship, superimposed on one another, vie for dominance.  As Judith Shklar and 
Rogers Smith have shown, even in the United States, where the Lockean liberal tradition has 
long been held to dominate political life, its sway fluctuated throughout history and was 
continuously contested in theory.”). 
 135. ROY, supra note 2, at 11. 
